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This proof refers to the known paper by J. Conway and S. Kochen which
appeared in the “Notices of the AMS,” in February 2009 (Vol. 56/2, p. 226).
Without loss of generality, we reduce the problem to its relevant main logical
structure. We assume that with a particle is associated a finite number n of
“directions” or “components” (n ≥ 2); at time t, on each component i, the par-
ticle either verifies the property or does not: we write P (t, i) = 0 or P (t, i) = 1,
respectively. At any time t, a component i of the particle “can be observed and
measured”; we write A(t, i) if the component i is observed at time t (formally,
A(t, i) can be considered as a predicate symbol). For the sake of coherence
with the informal observational meaning, we may introduce the axiom that, at
a given time, only one component can be observed:
1) ∀t, ∀i, j, [A(t, i) ∧A(t, j)→ (i = j)].
Formally, however, this axiom is not necessary for our purpose. The relevant
axioms are:
2) At any time t, if the component i is observed, its value is 0:
∀t, ∀i, [A(t, i)→ P (t, i) = 0].
3) At a given time t, not all components have the value 0:
∀t, q∀i, P (t, i) = 0.
Axiom 2) corresponds to the SPIN axiom of the Conway–Kochen paper and
refers to the measurement of spin operators of a quantum particle, which, in
three orthogonal directions, gives the values 1, 0, 1 in some order; in this case,
we write P (t, i) = 0, where i is one of the n = 33 Peres directions of orthogonal
triples. Axiom 2) then means that the measurement in the direction i at time t
gives the expected answer. Axiom 3) is a structural axiom corresponding to
the Bell or Kochen–Specker theorem (or paradox): it is impossible to have a
positive answer in all the 33 directions. Of course, if all components could be
observed at the same time, axioms 2) and 3) would be contradictory. This is a
reason for the first axiom.
Now—in order to speak of the freedom of a particle—we assume that there is
a theory F expressed in the language of physics, mathematics, and logic in which
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the notions indicated above are defined and axioms 2) and 3) for the particle are
included and which gives a deductive frame for the notion of freedom; namely,
we say that a particle is free if, at any time t, at least the value on one of its
components cannot be predetermined (its value proved) by events at time t′ < t
in the theory F :
(a) ∀t, ∃i, (F (t′) 0 P (t, i) = 0 and F (t′) 0 P (t, i) = 1),
where in F , for that matter, time variables t′, different from t, are such that
t′ < t (we write briefly t′ for all time variables different from t, and t is the
time at which the value on the component is to be determined); moreover, only
events that happen at time t′ < t appear in F . This is easy to understand, but
complicated to define. However, logically, formally, we need not do this here.
Finally, we say that an observation (or measurement) or, better, an ob-
server A is free if, at each time t, A is free to observe any component i. This
apparently only an intuitive notion can be treated in purely logical terms: in
A(t, i), the variable i is free or independent of the variable t (they are variables
of different kind) and, moreover, A(t, i) cannot be deduced from events at time
t′ < t; thus, with conditions as in (a) above:
(b) ∀t, ∀i, (F (t′) 0 A(t, i)) = 0 and F (t′) 0 qA(t, i)).
Theorem. If the theory is consistent and the observer A is free, then the particle
is also free.
Proof. If the particle is not free at time t, then, from (a), we get that, for each
component, its value at this time can be determined, i.e.,
∀i, (F (t′) ⊢ P (t, i) = 0 or F (t′) ⊢ P (t, i) = 1).
Since, by axiom 3), not for all i, P(t,i)=0, there exists an i such that
(∗) F (t′) 0 P (t, i) = 0.
But, however, it cannot be shown, positively, for this component i that
(c) F (t′) ⊢ P (t, i) = 1.
Indeed:
Informal proof. Since only events that happen at time t′ < t appear in F (t′)
and the observer A is free, it follows that, at time t, this observer is free to
observe i; then A(t, i) is true and, from axiom 2), we obtain P (t, i) = 0, which
contradicts (c) above. Therefore
(∗∗) F (t′) 0 P (t, i) = 1.
Formal proof. From (c) we get
(d) F (t′), A(t, i) ⊢ P (t, i) = 1,
but A(t, i), together with axiom 2), gives P (t, i) = 0, and hence also
(e) F (t′), A(t, i) ⊢ P (t, i) = 0,
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This means that F (t′) and A(t, i) are contradictory, and hence F (t′) ⊢ qA(t, i),
which, in turn, contradicts the second half of definition (b) above (because the
observer is supposed to be free). Finally, we see that (c) is contradictory, which
implies (∗∗).
But (∗) and (∗∗) together mean precisely that the particle is free at time t on
the component i, and this contradicts the hypothesis of the reductio ad absurdum
proof. Thus, we have proved that, at any time t, there is a component of the
particle whose value cannot be predetermined in the theory.
By an elementary combinatorial argument, the result can be strengthened
by requiring in the definition of a free particle that always at least the values
on two components are not determined.
Helsinki, 18 June, 2010
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